tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17607237.post8575103250232198671..comments2024-03-18T00:46:28.369-07:00Comments on Quantum Chaotic Thoughts: Unconditional JusticeMasonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04415369043595429843noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17607237.post-63107085934326113052011-10-03T00:39:11.029-07:002011-10-03T00:39:11.029-07:00I do agree with that completely. But I also think...I do agree with that completely. But I also think there is a happy medium between using it intelligently rather than blindly and not being allowed to use it at all. I think one should be allowed to use it reasonably and give the argument behind things. I think that the notion of "firm" will amount to throwing it out entirely rather than not being stupid with it, but hopefully I'm wrong and the notion of firm will be what you describe.<br /><br />In short, I suppose that my cynicism got the better of me a bit when I wrote this.Masonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04415369043595429843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-17607237.post-36091373827988041842011-10-02T19:46:41.081-07:002011-10-02T19:46:41.081-07:00I like harshing on lawyers as much as the next sci...I like harshing on lawyers as much as the next scientist, but actually reading the news story suggests something much more reasonable. The judge on the appeals court was not, it seems, throwing out Bayes's theorem, but rather refusing to be cowed by Bayes's theorem when the base rates and the likelihoods appearing in it are wild-ass guesses. To quote the news story you link to: "And so he decided that Bayes' theorem shouldn't again be used unless the underlying statistics are "firm"." This is, of course, the completely correct attitude; otherwise, the Bayesian posterior is simply without any evidential value whatsoever, and the difference between an expert stating "I'm, like, really sure" and "My posterior probability is 0.99" is entirely spurious precision.Cosmahttp://bactra.org/weblog/noreply@blogger.com